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Abstract
Modern software systems are commonly programmed in
multiple languages. Research into the security and correct-
ness of such multi-language programs has generally relied
on static methods that check both the individual compo-
nents as well as the interoperation between them. In practice,
however, components are sometimes linked in at run-time
through malicious means. In this paper we introduce a tech-
nique to specify operational semantics that securely combine
an abstraction-rich language with a model of an arbitrary at-
tacker, without relying on any static checks. The resulting
operational semantics, instead, lifts a proven memory iso-
lation mechanism into the resulting multi-language system.
We establish the security benefits of our technique by prov-
ing that the obtained multi-language system preserves and
reflects the equivalences of the abstraction-rich language. To
that end a notion of bisimilarity for this new type of multi-
language system is developed.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.1 [Programming
Languages]: Formal Definitions and Theory—Semantics
General Terms Languages, Interoperability, Security
Keywords memory protection, multi-language semantics,
bisimulation, fully abstract compilation
1. Introduction
Modern software systems consist of numerous interoperat-
ing components written in different source languages. Rea-
soning about the semantical properties of such a system is
often done by developing a combined language composed
of the models of the source languages.
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Securing a multi-language software system requires, at
least, that the combined language preserves the abstractions
of each of the composed languages. This is because language
based security relies on a notion of equivalence: no client
of a component should be able to distinguish between two
different implementations of that component if all manifes-
tations of the differences between the implementations are
masked by language abstractions. A client of two λ-calculus
terms (λx .(iszero x ) & true) and (λx .(iszero x )), for ex-
ample, cannot distinguish between the two as the λ-term ab-
stracts away the implementation details of its subterm.
When the abstractions of the composed languages are not
preserved, a malicious interoperating component can thus
violate the security of the other components [1].
Previous approaches to securing multi-language software
systems have relied on static methods that check both the
components individually as well as the interoperation be-
tween them [8, 9, 23]. However because some software com-
ponents may be dynamically linked at run-time, written in
languages with no abstractions or susceptible to code injec-
tion attacks, these static solutions are easily circumvented
in practice [17]. Current multi-language security techniques
thus do not preserve the abstractions of the composed lan-
guages when faced with a component that is malicious.
We refer to such a malicious component as the arbitrary
machine-level attacker.
To study this problem, this paper introduces a tech-
nique for specifying operational semantics that enable an
abstraction-rich language to interoperate securely with a
model of an arbitrary machine-level attacker without rely-
ing on any static checks on the components not written in
the abstraction-rich language. To that end this paper lifts a
proven memory isolation mechanism that protects a certain
memory area by restricting access to that area through a set
of designated entry points, into the semantics of the com-
bined language (Section 2). Efforts are underway to embed
such a memory isolation mechanism into future commercial
Intel processors [16].
We illustrate our technique by securing the interoperation
between the simply typed λ-calculus, hereafter referred to
as the λs-calculus and a model for an arbitrary machine-
level attacker. This machine-level attacker is modeled as a
λ-calculus extended with the syntactical equality operator
≡, referred to as the λa-calculus. Given how precise such an
operator is at distinguishing components, we argue that the
λa-calculus is a good model of an arbitrary attacker.
We provide an informal overview to our method by first
combining the λa- and λs-calculus into the combined lan-
guage λm, using the commonly used multi-language seman-
tics of Matthews and Findler [15] (Section 3). This combined
language, however, does not preserve the abstractions of the
λs-calculus. Lifting the memory isolation mechanism into
the λm-calculus to resolve this security issue fails due to
the direct syntactical embedding that Matthews and Find-
ler’s method relies on.
This issue is resolved by removing the direct syntactical
embedding between the λs- and λa-calculus (Section 4). In-
stead the interoperation between both calculi is encoded into
partial evaluation stacks similar to how continuation passing
style conversion makes continuations explicit. The resulting
combined language is referred to as the λ+-calculus.
To establish that the resulting combined language λ+ is
capable of preserving the abstractions of the λs-calculus,
a secure/fully abstract compilation scheme from the λs-
calculus to the λ+-calculus is introduced. This compila-
tion scheme preserves and reflects the equivalences of the
λs calculus (Section 5). Contextually equivalent terms in
the λs-calculus are thus compiled to contextually equivalent
terms in the λ+-calculus and all compiled terms that are
contextually equivalent in the λ+-calculus are contextually
equivalent in the λs-calculus.
Because directly proving contextual equivalence is com-
plex [22], we develop bisimulations that coincide with con-
textual equivalence for the λs- and λ+-calculus. The fact
that this compilation scheme is indeed fully abstract is es-
tablished by systematically relating the states of the bisimu-
lations over the λs- and λ+-calculi.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Operational semantics that ensure secure interoperability
between the simply typed λ-calculus and an arbitrary
machine-level attacker.
• A bisimulation over the produced combined language.
• A fully abstract compilation scheme from the simply
typed λ-calculus to the combined language that results
from our technique.
This technique for specifying operational semantics for se-
cure interoperation is currently limited to multi-language
software systems between two languages as well as lan-
guages that are not concurrent. In the future, however, this
technique could be extended to multi-language software sys-
tems that securely interoperate between a number of com-
plex and concurrent languages.
2. A Memory Isolation Mechanism
Preserving the abstractions of a source language from an ar-
bitrary machine-level attacker has been achieved by employ-
ing a memory isolation mechanism [4, 19]. In this paper we
lift a low-level isolation mechanism referred to as Protected
Modules Architecture (PMA) into the operational semantics
of a multi-language system.
PMA is a fine-grained, program counter-based, memory
access control mechanism that divides memory into pro-
tected and unprotected memory. The protected memory is
further split into two sections: a protected code section ac-
cessible only through designated entry points, and a pro-
tected data section that can only be accessed by the code
section. As such the unprotected memory is limited to exe-
cuting the code at the entry points, neither the code nor the
data of the protected memory can be executed, written or
read by the unprotected memory. An overview of the access
control mechanism between the protected and unprotected
memory is given in Table 1.
From \To Protected Unprotected
Entry Code Data
Protected r x r x r w r w x
Unprotected x r w x
Table 1: PMA protects its data by forcing the unprotected
memory to use the designated entry points.
Note that this technique could be considered to be the
dual of sandboxing. When securing a system through sand-
boxing it is the attacker that is placed within a confined
memory area, while the secure program operates as usual.
A variety of PMA implementations exist. While most of
them are research prototypes [18, 21], Intel is developing
a new set CPU instructions, referred to as SGX, that en-
able the creation of protected modules in commercial pro-
cessors [16].
3. Informal Overview
A combined language must preserve and reflect the equiv-
alences of the combined languages. This section firstly de-
tails why the λa-calculus is an accurate model of an arbitrary
machine-level attacker (Section 3.1). The λa-calculus is then
combined with the simply typed λ-calculus (λs) by apply-
ing Matthews and Findler’s natural embedding, resulting in
a calculus that we refer to as the λm-calculus (Section 3.2).
This λm-calculus is, however, not capable of preserving the
equivalences of the λs-calculus. To resolve that issue we at-
tempt to lift the PMA mechanism into the calculus but fail
(Section 3.3). The failures encountered point out how to de-
velop a combined language that can lift the PMA mechanism
(Section 3.4).
The terms, types and contexts of the λs-calculus are type-
set in a bold black font. The terms and contexts of the
λa-calculus, are typeset in a grey-sans serifs font .
3.1 The λa-Calculus as an Attacker Model
As mentioned previously, language based security relies
solely on a notion of equivalence. The λa-calculus, an un-
typed lambda calculus with a syntactical equality operator,
is a relevant attacker model as it has no equivalences other
than trivial syntactical equalities. For any λa-term t there
exists a λa-context C that can distinguish t from any term
that differs from it syntactically as follows.
C = (t ≡ [·])
where ≡ is a syntactical equality operator.
While the syntactical equality operation may seem like an
overly strong attacker model, we argue that the syntactical
equality operator simply reflects a machine-level attackers
ability to distinguish between any combination of bits that it
has access to. We do not extend the attacker with the ability
to modify or introduce terms dynamically. This is not nec-
essary as previous work by Wand [25] has established that
inspection alone is sufficient as an attacker model, extend-
ing the attacker does not strengthen it.
3.2 A Natural Embedding of the λs- and λa-calculus
The natural embedding introduces two new terms into the
combined λm-calculus: ASσ t and σSA t. The former is a
λa-term that embeds a λs-term t and the latter is a λs-term
that embeds a λa-term t. Both terms are annotated with a λs-
type σ. These type annotations are used to perform dynamic
typechecks on the interaction between the terms of the λa-
and λs-calculi to ensure that the typing properties of the λs-
calculus are preserved.
In the λm-calculus primitive values are simply converted
into the respective representation when they transition be-
tween the composed languages. Function calls rely on a
wrapping mechanism: when the λs-calculus, for example,
gains access to a λ-term of the λa-calculus it wraps that λ-
term into a new λs-calculus λ-term as follows:
σ→σ′SA (λx.t)→ λy : σ.(σ′SA ((λx.t) (ASσ y)))
The λm-calculus is not capable of preserving the abstrac-
tions of the λs-calculus. Take for example the following two
λs-calculus terms.
tIF =(λx : σ.if #t then x else x)
tID =(λy : σ.y)
The terms tIF and tID are contextually equivalent in the
λs-calculus as there is no λs-calculus context that can dis-
tinguish them. However in the combined λm-calculus these
two terms are no longer contextually equivalent as the fol-
lowing λm-calculus context can distinguish between them.
CID = (AS
σ→σ (λy : σ.y) ≡ ASσ→σ [·])
The problem at hand is that ASσ t is a λa-term whose
contents can be compared against any other λa-term, in the
same way that a low-level attacker can compare any two sets
of bits that it has access to.
3.3 Lifting PMA into the λm-Calculus
This paper aims to preserve the abstractions of the source
languages of a multi-language software system by lifting
the memory isolation model of PMA into the combined lan-
guage. To that end the λm-calculus is investigated as a model
of PMA. Note that we are aware of the fact that operational
semantics of λm-calculus were explicitly designed to ab-
stract away low-level details such as memory models. The
goal of this section is to clarify our reasons for introducing a
new operational semantics.
Clearly the λm-calculus is capable of modeling the split
memory model of the PMA mechanism: simply assume that
the terms of the λs-calculus reside in the protected memory
and that the terms of the λa-calculus reside in the unpro-
tected memory. By extension the λa-term ASσ t represents
an entry point to a λs-calculus term and the λs-term σSA t
represents an unprotected call to a λa-calculus term.
This model, however, is not precise enough. A first is-
sue is the use of ASσ t to model the entry point mechanism
of PMA. Reconsider our previously problematic λm-context
CID. Whether or not this context is able to distinguish be-
tween tIF and tID when ASσ t is assumed to be entry point
to a protected piece of memory relies, in practice, on what
the binary values of the entry points are.
The λm-calculus, however, does not allow us to reason
about the binary values of the entry points. This limita-
tion also artificially restricts the attacker model: in the λm-
calculus the attacker can only manipulate the entry points
that have been shared with it. In practice, however, an at-
tacker is capable of calling any existing entry point by guess-
ing its address.
A second issue is the way the λm-calculus wraps the inse-
cure functions it gains access to. As illustrated in Figure 1, a
memory representation of what happens when a λs-calculus
program is given a λa-calculus function (λx.t), every time a
λs-program is given a λa-function it wraps that function into
Attacker
Memory
((λx.t) ASσ •)
Protected
Memory
(λy : σ.σ
′
SA •)
ASσ y
binding
Figure 1: The sub-terms of: λy : σ.σ
′
SA ((λx.t) ASσ y)
are spread across protected and unprotected memory.
a lambda function of its own and as a result writes out a new
chunk of memory to the unprotected memory space. As re-
quired by λm this memory chunk encodes an application of
the received function to an entry point to the bound variable
of the enclosing λ-term. A λs-calculus program thus writes
out a chunk of memory to the unprotected memory when it
receives an insecure function, irrespective of whether or not
it immediately calls that function.
In practice, an attacker in the unprotected memory will be
able to both observe and execute that memory chunk before
the shared function is used. The λm-calculus is not capable
of modeling such an attack, thus leaving the consequences
of the attack open to the implementation. We argue that this
way of modelling function calls raises more questions and
possible security problems than it resolves.
3.4 Our Approach to Modeling the PMA Mechanism
We propose to resolve the issues that plague the λm-calculus
by removing the direct syntactical embedding (Section 3.4.1),
modeling the entry points as a naming mechanism (Sec-
tion 3.4.2) and simplifying function calls (Section 3.4.3).
3.4.1 Removing Syntactical Embedding
As in Section 3.3, assume that the terms of the λs-calculus
reside in the protected memory of the PMA mechanism
and that the terms of the λa-calculus reside in unprotected
memory. We represent this assumption literally by grouping
λa-terms and λs-terms at their respective side of a fixed
syntactical boundary as follows:
λa-terms || λs-terms
Because we limit our technique to sequential languages, only
one term on one side of the program can be executing at any
given moment. In order to enforce this, all terms outside of
the term that is executing must feature a hole: [·].
These holes encode the call stack between the λa-calculus
and the λs-calculus, as done previously in Jeffrey and
Rathke’s fully abstract trace semantics for Java Jr [14]. Each
hole in a λa-term is thus only to be filled by a term from the
λs-calculus and vice versa.
3.4.2 Entry Points as Names
To more accurately model the entry points mechanism we
extend the λa-calculus with enumerable names ni that de-
note the λs-calculus terms that are accessible to terms of the
λa-calculus. Programs in the λa-calculus can compare and
construct these names, thus removing the previous limita-
tions of the λm-calculus.
Reconsider, once again, our previously problematic λm-
context. It is now defined as follows:
CID = (nr ≡ [·]) || λs-terms
where the name nr is a random guess by the attacker. The
question now is whether or not the context CID could ever
guess a name that allows it to distinguish between the λs-
terms tIF and tID.
Our approach to protecting from this attack is to deter-
ministically create a new name every time a λs-term is
shared with the λa-calculus, effectively enumerating the
shared functionality. Two λs-programs will thus share the
same set of names with a λa-calculus context if and only if
they share the same number of λ-terms with that context.
Our example context CID is thus unable to distinguish be-
tween tIF and tID or any other two λs-terms that share only
one name. Even though it can easily guess the deterministi-
cally created names.
Note that this does not mean that any two λs-calculus
terms that share the same number of λ-terms to a λa-context,
will be indistinguishable to that context. The values and
function calls that two λs-calculus terms share with a λa-
calculus context can still be observed and distinguished.
Note again that these names are terms of the λa-calculus,
not of the λs-calculus. As such they do not prohibit a full
abstraction result, as shown in Section 5.3.
Also note that we restrict the usage of names to sharing
λ-terms across the syntax boundary. In practice the PMA
mechanism requires two more entry points: one for setting
up the communication between the protected and unpro-
tected memory and one that handles callbacks from the un-
protected memory to the protected memory. Because every
program will have these two entry points, they do not affect
contextual equivalence and we thus do not model them.
3.4.3 Simplified Function Calls
Instead of wrapping shared λ-terms into a λ-term of the re-
ceiving language as in the λm-calculus, the combined cal-
culi are extended with terms that denote the availability of
λ-terms from the opposing side. In the λa-calculus that term
is as mentioned previously a name ni, in the λs-calculus that
term is σSA (λx.t). This term models the direct access that
the λs-calculus has to the functions of the λa-calculus.
When a λs-calculus program now calls a λa-calculus
function (λx.t), for example, it simply passes a reference
to that function as well as its arguments to the λa-calculus
program on the other side of the syntactical boundary.
This is in contrast to the λm-calculus, where calling the
λa-calculus function (λx.t) is done by calling an insecure
memory chunk that encodes an application of that function
to a callback to the λs-calculus.
4. The λ+-Calculus
To resolve the modeling limitations of the λm-calculus we
introduce a new combined language the λ+-calculus that
incorporates the solutions proposed in Section 3.4.
The λ+-calculus introduces new syntax (Section 4.1),
a larger program definition (Section 4.2), new operational
semantics (Section 4.3), additional typing rules (Section 4.4)
and a modified notion of type soundness (Section 4.5). We
t ::= x v ::= b b ::= #t E ::= [·]
| t1 t2 | (λx.t) |#f | E t
| t1 ≡ t2 | wrong | v E
| call ni t | ni | call ni E
| v | call ni v
t ::= x v ::= b σ ::= Bool E ::= [·]
| t1 t2 | (λx : σ.t) | σ → σ | E t
| if t1 t2 t3 | σSA (λx.t) b ::= #t | v E
| v |#f | if E t t
Figure 2: The λ+-calculus adds names and direct function
references to the syntax.
provide a few examples to illustrate the effectiveness of our
attacker model in this composed language (Section 4.6).
4.1 Syntax
The syntax of the λ+-calculus combines the λs-calculus and
λa-calculus as illustrated in Figure 2.
Felleisen-and-Hieb-style reduction semantics are used to
specify the operational semantics [6]. To that end the λs-
calculus evaluation context E and the λa-calculus evaluation
context E are introduced to lift the basic reduction steps to a
standard left-to-right call-by-value semantics.
The λs-calculus is extended with a term: σSA (λx.t) that
denotes the direct access programs in the λs-calculus have
to the functions of a λa-calculus program, as those functions
reside in the unprotected memory. This term is type anno-
tated to enable the semantics to wrap the call to the denoted
function with a typecheck on the output of that function.
Terms of the λa-calculus cannot directly access the pro-
tected terms of the λs-calculus. They are instead limited to
the designated entry-points of the PMA mechanism. The
names ni model these designated entry-points. The set of
names are denumerable as: ni 6= nj if i 6= j . A λa-calculus
attacker can compare these names through the syntactical
equality operator ≡ and can apply them to values using the
term call ni v.
The λa-calculus is not extended with any means to create
new names dynamically. Instead we assume that, as in the
example in Section 3.4.2, the attacker guesses the determin-
istically created names beforehand. For every possible name
ni we have that there exists a context C that can distinguish it
from other names (C = (ni ≡ [·])) or apply it to some value
v (C = (call ni v)). The ability to create names dynamically
does not produce stronger contexts.
Note that the λs-calculus does not treat call terms as val-
ues. This is because, as mentioned in Section 3.4.1, the λs-
calculus is extended with a call stack capable of encoding
such calls and returns. The λa-calculus is, however, an at-
tacker and should thus be able to manipulate the structure of
its call stack.
4.2 Program definition
The λ+-calculus does not syntactically embed the composed
languages λs- and λa-calculus. The calculus instead com-
bines a λs-calculus configuration, that is assumed to reside
in secure memory, with a λa-calculus configuration, that is
assumed to reside in the unprotected memory, into the pro-
gram definition.
The program definition considers two modes of interac-
tion. In one mode the λs-calculus configuration is execut-
ing, while the λa-calculus configuration is waiting on in-
put from the λs-calculus configuration. In the other mode a
λa-calculus configuration is executing, while the λs-calculus
configuration is either empty or waiting on a callback from
the λa-calculus configuration.
The λs Configuration A λs-calculus configuration S is
defined as follows:
S = N  Σ • t : σ | N  Σ
where Σ = E : σf | ε
and N ::= ? | N′, ni 7→ (t,σ)
where E denotes a sequence of open evaluation contexts E
with a hole [·] and σf denotes a sequence of function types
σ1 → σ2. The sequence of type annotated open evaluation
contexts Σ thus represents the λs-calculus program’s view
of the evaluation stack in a way that is similar to the stack
mechanism used by Jeffrey and Rathke’s fully abstract trace
semantics for Java Jr. [14].
The map N is used to keep track of the names that a λs-
calculus program shares with a program in the λa-calculus.
The first case of the definition describes an executing λs-
configuration, denoted as Se, that executes a λs-term t. This
λs-term is type annotated to allow the operational semantics
to construct new typed annotated evaluation stacks at run-
time. The second case describes a passive λs-configuration,
denoted as Sp, that waits on correctly typed input from the
λa-calculus term.
The λa Configuration A λa-calculus configuration A is
defined as follows:
A ::= C • t | C
where C denotes a sequence of λa-contexts C. A context C
differs from an open evaluation context E: the former is any
term with a hole in it, the latter is any term with a hole in the
place where the next reduction step happens. We thus define
a λa-calculus program’s view of the evaluation stack as a
sequence of possible attacks.
The first case of the definition describes an executing λa-
configuration, denoted as Ae. The second case describes
a passive λa-configuration that awaits input from a λs-
configuration Se, denoted as Ap.
Internal Computations of the λa-Calculus
C • E[((λx.t) v)] || Sp  C • E[t[v/x]] || Sp (A-App)
C • E[(v1 v2)] || Sp  C • E[wrong] || Sp where v1 6= (λx.t) (A-ApW)
C • E[t1 ≡ t2] || Sp  C • E[#t] || Sp where t1 = t2 (A-Eq1)
C • E[t1 ≡ t2] || Sp  C • E[#f] || Sp where t1 6= t2 (A-Eq2)
C • E[wrong] || Sp  wrong || Sp (A-Wr)
Internal Computations of the λs-Calculus
C || N  Σ • E[((λx : σ.t) v)] : σ  C || N  Σ • E[t[v/x]] : σ (S-App)
C || N  Σ • E[if #t t2 t3] : σ  C || N  Σ • E[t2] : σ (S-IFT)
C || N  Σ • E[if #f t2 t3] : σ  C || N  Σ • E[t3] : σ (S-IFF)
Protected Computations
C,C || N  Σ • (λx : σ′.t) : σf  C,C[ni] || N, ni 7→ ((λx.t),σ)  Σ where i = |N|+ 1 (S-Name)
C • ni || N  Σ,E : σ1 → σ2  C || N  Σ • E[t] : σ2 where N(ni) = (t,σ1) (A-Name)
C,C • ni || N  Σ,E : σ1 → σ2  C,C[wrong] || ?  ε where N(ni) 6= (t,σ) or ni 6∈ dom(N) (WrongN)
C • call ni v || N  Σ C • v || N  Σ • (t [·]) : σ where N(ni) = (t,σ) (A-Call)
C,C • call ni v || N  Σ C • C[wrong] || ?  ε where ni 6∈ dom(N) (WrongC)
Unprotected Computations
C • (λx.t) || N  Σ,E : σf → σ  C || N  Σ • E[(λy : σ1.((σfSA (λx.t)) y))] : σ (A-Lam)
C,C • v || N  Σ,E : σf  C • C[wrong] || ?  ε where v 6= (λx.t) (WrongL)
C,C || N  Σ • σfSA (λx.t) : σf  C • C[(λx.t)] || N  Σ (S-Lam)
C,C || N  Σ • E[((σfSA t) v)] : σ  C,C[(t [·])] || N  Σ,E : σ2 → σ • v : σ1 (S-Call)
Value Passing
C • b || N  Σ,E : Bool→ σ  C || N  Σ • E[b] : σ (A-Bool)
C,C || N  Σ • b : Bool C • C[b] || N  Σ (S-Bool)
C,C • v || N  Σ,E : Bool→ σ  C,C[wrong] || ?  ε where v 6= b (WrongB)
Figure 3: The reduction rules of the λ+-calculus. The type σ1 → σ2 is shortened to σf for the sake of brevity. The expression
E[t] fills the hole of E with t in the obvious way and the expression C[t] fills the hole of C in the obvious way.
The Program A programP that considers the two possible
execution states is defined as follows:
P ::= t || Sp or C || Se
where || separates the configurations of the λa- and λs-
calculi and by extension divides the unprotected memory
from the protected memory.
To simplify the later full abstraction results we assume
that the secure λs-calculus configuration is always first to
execute: P0 = C || Se. A program thus always terminates
with a value on the insecure side: Pf = C • v || N  ε.
4.3 Operational Semantics
The reduction rules of the λ+-calculus, denoted as P  P ′,
are illustrated in Figure 3. We divide these rules into four
categories: internal computations, protected computations,
unprotected computations and primitive value passing.
Internal Computations Internal computations are reduc-
tion rules that only affect the terms of one of the two lan-
guages. In these reduction rules the terms of one of the lan-
guages remain unchanged. Function application, for exam-
ple, is an internal computation (rules A-App and S-App).
Note that the rule A-Wr artificially restricts the attacker
model. In practice, an arbitrary attacker can recover from
errors. However, the λs-configuration is cleared out when-
ever the λa-attacker returns an incorrectly typed value (rules
WrongN, WrongC, WrongL and WrongB). As such the ac-
tions of an attacker after something has gone wrong are not
relevant to the security result of this work.
Protected Computations Protected computations are re-
duction rules that enable the λa-calculus terms to call func-
tions of the λs-calculus. In these reduction rules the map N
ensures that a λa-calculus attacker is limited to the λs-terms
that have been shared with it.
In rule S-Name a λs-calculus λ-term is passed across to
the hole of the λa-context, by sharing the next name ni from
the countable set of names with the λa-configuration. This
new name and its associated type and term are stored in the
map N.
In rules A-Name and WrongN, a name ni is passed back
to the head of the λs-calculus evaluation stack Σ. If the name
is associated with a λs-term that has the same type as the
hole then that λs-term fills the hole, otherwise the system
terminates in error.
In rules A-Call and WrongC a name ni is applied to a
value. If the name matches a λs-term in the map N, a new
λs-calculus reduction context, that applies a λa-value to
the fetched term, is pushed onto the λs-calculus evaluation
stack.
Unprotected Computations Unprotected computations are
reduction rules that enable the λs-calculus to call functions
of the λa-calculus. In these reduction rules only the type
annotations and associated dynamic type checks are required
to ensure security.
In rules A-Lam and WrongL a λa-calculus λ-term is
passed across to the head of the λs-calculus evaluation stack
Σ if it expects a function. As a result the transmitted λ-term
is tagged with the type of the hole it fills.
In rule S-Lam, a λa-calculus λ-term is passed back to
the context C, the head of the λa-configurations sequence of
possible attacks.
In rule S-Call the λa-calculus function σfSA t is applied
to a λs-calculus value. The resulting reduction step differs
from the reduction step A-Call in two ways. The first differ-
ence is that the rule does not push a new reduction context
onto the λa-calculus. Instead the function call is directly in-
serted into the waiting λa-context. This direct approach al-
lows us to accurately model the observational capabilities of
an arbitrary machine level attacker, as such an attacker can
directly observe any call to its functions. Note that as a result
of this direct approach, there is no guarantee that the function
call to σfSA t will be succesful. Given that the λa-calculus
models the arbitrary attacker this is to be accepted.
The second difference is that in the λs-calculus a cross
boundary function call is not a value. In the λa-calculus
cross boundary function calls are values, to ensure that every
such call can be followed up by an attack C.
Primitive Value Passing Passing primitive value does not
result in the creation of new names or stack frames. In re-
duction rules A-Bool and S-Bool the booleans are converted
to the appropriate representation.
4.4 Typing rules
The simply typed call-by-value lambda calculus (the λs-
calculus) is typed as follows:
x : σ ∈ Γ
Γ ` x : σ
Γ,x : σ1 ` t : σ2
Γ ` (λx : σ1.t) : σ1 → σ2
b : Bool
Γ ` t1 : σ1 → σ2 Γ ` t2 : σ1
Γ ` t1 t2 : σ2
Γ ` t1 : Bool Γ ` t2 : σ Γ ` t3 : σ
Γ ` if t1 t2 t3 : σ
The λ+-calculus extends the λs-calculus with a value
σSA (λx.t) which is typed as follows:
Γ ` σSA (λx.t) : σ
To type a Program P we only type the configuration S using
the following rules.
Γ ` S
Γ ` A || S Γ ` ?
Γ ` N Γ ` (λx.t) : σ
Γ ` N, [ni 7→ ((λx.t),σ)]
Γ ` N
Γ ` N  ε
Γ ` N  Σ Γ ` N  t : σ
Γ ` N  Σ • t : σ
Γ ` N  Σ Γ,x : σ1 ` N  E[x] : σ2
Γ ` N  Σ,E : σ1 → σ2
To type check a configuration S, each individual reduction
context of the evaluation stack Σ is type checked by adding
the type of the hole to the variable scope. Each association
in the map N is typed as well.
4.5 Type Soundness
As mentioned previously only the λs-configuration of a pro-
gram P is type checked. As such we cannot introduce a tra-
ditional notion of type soundness. Instead we establish that
whenever a program gets stuck or reduces to the error wrong,
the λa-configuration is the cause.
Note that this approach to type soundness is very similar
to Wadler’s and Findler’s blame calculus [24]. The similari-
ties with their work are, however, out of scope for this paper.
Theorem 1 (Type Preservation). Given Γ ` P and
P  P ′ we have that Γ ` P ′.
Proof Sketch. We consider the most important cases:
• A || N  Σ • t : σ  A || N  Σ • t′ : σ: We have
that Γ ` t′ : σ follows from the fact that the λ+-calculus
preserves the reduction rules of the λs-calculus.
• A || N  Σ • t : σ  A′ || N  Σ • t′ : σ: The
internal reduction rules of the λa-calculus do not modify
the λs-configuration
• A || N  Σ,E : σ1 → σ2  A′ || N  Σ,E[t] : σ2:
By the reduction rules WrongN, WrongL, WrongC and
WrongB we have that: Γ ` t : σ1 and thus that
Γ ` E[t] : σ2.
• For rule A-Call we have that Γ ` N  Σ • (t [·]) : σ as
N(ni) = (t,σ) and Γ ` N by the assumption.
Theorem 2 (Type Progress). Given Γ ` S then if P 6 P ′
or P  wrong || ?  ε then A is the cause.
Proof Sketch. We consider the most relevant cases:
• P = A || N  Σ • t : σ : We have that P  A || N 
Σ • t′ : σ as the λ+-calculus preserves the reduction
rules of the λs-calculus.
• P = A || N  Σ • v : σ : By the reduction rules S-
Name, S-Lam and S-Bool we have that P  P ′ if and
only if there is at least one context C in the passive λa-
configuration C.
• P = A || N  Σ : We have that P  P ′ if the executing
λa-configuration t reduces to a value v. If the value is not
of the correct type we have that P ′ = wrong || ?  ε.
4.6 Attacker Model Examples
We illustrate the effectiveness of the attacker model in the
combined λ+-calculus by detailing λa-configurations that
can distinguish between two λs-configurations that perform
different function calls and two λs-configurations with dif-
ferent maps N.
Different Function Calls Consider the following two λs-
configurations.
S1 = ?  if [·](σSA (λx.#t) #t)#f : Bool→ Bool •
(σSA (λx.#t) #t) : Bool
S2 = ?  if [·](σSA (λx.#t) #f)#f : Bool→ Bool •
(σSA (λx.#t) #t) : Bool
These two λs-configurations call the same λa-function
twice. In the second function call, however, the function
is applied to #t in S1 and #f in S2. The following λa-
configuration can distinguish between the two.
Aa = (((λx.#t) #t) ≡ [·]), [·]
The first context of Aa will process the first function call as
expected by the λs-calculus. The second context compares
the contents of the second function call.
Different Maps The following two λs-configurations:
S1 = [n1 7→ ((λx.#t),σ)], [n2 7→ ((λx.(λy.y)),σ′)]  ε
S2 = [n1 7→ ((λx.#t),σ)], [n2 7→ ((λx.#t),σ)]  ε
differ only for the name n2, which points to two non-
contextually equivalent functions. The following λa-config.
can distinguish between the two.
Aa = (n3 ≡ [·]) • call n2 #f
This configuration first calls the name n2 with a value #f.
As a result it will receive a new name n3 in one case and a
value #t in the other the attacker context will thus reduce to
#t in the first case and #f in the second.
5. Full Abstraction
Proving that the λ+-calculus is capable of preserving the
abstractions of the λs-calculus is done by introducing a fully
abstract compilation scheme form the λs-calculus to the λ+-
calculus. This fully abstract compilation scheme preserves
the equivalences of the λs-calculus in the λ+-calculus.
Direct proofs over contextual equivalence are difficult
however, as one needs to reason about any reduction in
any context. To that end we develop notions of bisimulation
that coincide with contextual equivalence for the λs-calculus
(Section 5.1) and for the compiled terms in the λ+-calculus
(Section 5.2). Proving that the compilation scheme is fully
abstract is done by relating the bisimulations (Section 5.3).
5.1 A Congruent Bisimulation for the λs-Calculus
We define contextual equivalence 's (Section 5.1.1) and a
bisimulation relation S (Section 5.1.2) and over the terms of
the λs-calculus. The bisimulation is a congruence and thus
coincides with contextual equivalence (Section 5.1.3).
5.1.1 Contextual Equivalence for the λs-Calculus
A λs context C is a λs-term with a single hole [·] in it. We
now define contextual equivalence as follows [5]:
Definition 1. Contextual equivalence ('s) is defined as:
t1 's t2 ⇐⇒ ∀C. ∃b. C[t1]→∗ b ⇐⇒ C[t2]→∗ b
where→∗ denotes convergence.
Note that two contextually equivalent terms are the same
type as a context observes the same typing rules as the
programs of the λs-calculus.
5.1.2 A Bisimulation for the λs-Calculus
There have been multiple different bisimulations over the
simply typed λ-calculus. In this paper we adopt Gordon’s
definition and associated LTS over the simply typed λ-
calculus [10]. The LTS models the interaction between the
context and a λs-calculus term.
The LTS is a triple (t,α, α−−→) where terms t are the
states, α the set of labels and α−−→ the labelled transitions
between states. The labels α are defined as follows:
α ::= γ | τ
γ ::= @v | true | false
Labelled Reductions are of the form t
γ−−→ t′. Values are
observable by a context and are labelled as follows:
(λx : σ.t)
@v−−−→ ((λx : σ.t) v) (Label-App)
where ` @v : σ
#t
true−−−−→ #t (Label-T)
#f
false−−−−→ #f (Label-F)
The LTS models the interactions between a λs-calculus con-
text C and a λs-calculus program. In reduction rule Label-
App the context observes the contents of a λ-term by apply-
ing values to it. Because the λs-calculus terms and contexts
are typed the applied values are restricted to those that con-
form to the type rules.
In reduction rules Label-T and Label-F boolean values
are observed directly as booleans contain no abstractions.
Reduction steps between terms cannot be observed by a
context and are thus labelled as silent:
t→ t′
t
τ−−→ t′
(Label-S)
We define a weak bisimulation over this LTS. In contrast to
a strong bisimulation, such a bisimulation does not use the
silent transitions between two states. Define the transition
relation t
γ
=⇒ t′ as t τ−−→∗ γ−−→ t′ where τ−−→∗ is the reflexive
transitive closure of the silent transitions τ−−→.
Bisimulation is now defined as follows:
Definition 2. The relation S is a bisimulation if and only if
t1 S t2 implies:
(1) Given t1
γ
=⇒ t′1 there is t′2 : t2 γ=⇒ t′2 ∧ t′1 S t′2
(2) Given t2
γ
=⇒ t′2 there is t′1 : t1 γ=⇒ t′1 ∧ t′1 S t′2
We denote bisimilarity, the largest bisimulation, as ≈s.
5.1.3 Full Abstraction of the Bisimilarity
We conclude that the bisimilarity ≈s coincides with contex-
tual equivalence 's.
Theorem 3 (Full Abstraction of the Bisimilarity).
t1 's t2 ⇔ t1 ≈s t2
Due to space constraints, the proof of this theorem and
those of the following lemma have been placed in an online
Appendix A1.
A proof sketch of this theorem is available in Appen-
dix A.1. The proof sketch is a straight forward adaptation
of Gordon’s proof of congruence for a bisimulation over
1 https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/14314349/operational/proofs.pdf
PCF [10]. The proof sketch leverages the symmetry prop-
erties of both bisimilarity and contextual equivalence and
splits the theorem into two sublemma: contextual equiva-
lence implies bisimilarity (Completeness) and bisimilarity
implies contextual equivalence (Soundness). The latter is es-
tablished by applying Howe’s method [11].
5.2 A Congruent Bisimulation for the λ+-Calculus
As in Section 5.1 we define a notion of bisimulation, whose
bisimilarity is a congruence over the terms of the λ+-
calculus (Section 5.2.2). We first introduce a definition of
contextual equivalence that reflects the assumptions of the
compilation scheme (Section 5.2.1).
5.2.1 Contextual Equivalence for the λ+-Calculus
The goal of the secure compilation scheme is to preserve the
abstractions of the λs-calculus in the combined λ+-calculus.
The secure compilation does not simply compile λs-calculus
terms into a λs- or λa-calculi context. Instead it produces
a λs configuration S that interoperates with any possible
λa-configuration in a secure manner. We can thus define
contextual equivalence as follows:
Definition 3. (Contextual equivalence for λs Configura-
tions) S1 'c S2 ⇐⇒ ∀A.(A || S1 )⇑ ⇐⇒ (A || S2 )⇑
where ⇑ denotes divergence [20]. A program P diverges if it
executes an unbounded number of reduction steps. Formally
P⇑ ⇐⇒ ∀n ∈ N.∃P ′.t→n P ′.
Note that this formulation of contextual equivalence dif-
fers from the definition in Section 5.1.1. We adopt this diver-
gence based definition of contextual equivalence to simplify
the proof of congruence.
5.2.2 A Bisimulation for the λ+-Calculus
The LTS is a triple (S, α+, α
+
−−−→) where configurations S
are the states, α+ the set of labels and α
+
−−−→ the labelled
transitions between states. The labels α+ are defined as
follows:
α+ ::= γ+ | τ+
γ+ ::= (λx.t) | @v | ni |  (λx.t) ; v |  n ; v
true | false | wrong | done
These labels describe what a λa-configuration A observes
from its interactions with a configuration S. The labelled
reductions of the LTS (Figure 4) are of the form S
γ+−−−→
S′. While the λa-configuration is not represented in these
labelled reductions, the changes to the λa-configuration can
be derived from the labels.
The labelled reduction rules O-True, O-False, O-Name
and O-Lambda describe the values that a λa-configuration
observes from a λs-configuration. The labelled reduction
rules I-Bool, I-Name, and I-Lambda describe the values a
N  Σ • #f : Bool false−−−→ N  Σ (O-False)
?  ε done−−−−→ ?  ε (O-Done)
N  Σ wrong−−−−−→ ?  ε (I-Wrong)
N  Σ • #t : Bool true−−−→ N  Σ (O-True)
N  Σ • σSA (λx.t) : σ (λx.t)−−−−→ N  Σ (O-Lambda)
N  Σ,E : Bool→ σ @b−−−→ N  Σ • E[b] : σ (I-Bool)
N  Σ • (λx : σ.t) : σf ni−−−→ N, ni 7→ ((λx : σ.t),σf )  Σ (O-Name)
N  Σ,E : σf → σ @ni−−−−→ N  Σ • E[t] : σ where N(ni) = (t,σf ) (I-Name)
N  Σ,E : σf → σ @(λx.t)−−−−−−→ N  Σ • E[σfSA (λx.t)] : σ (I-Lambda)
N  Σ ni−−→ N  Σ • (t [·]) : σ1 → σ2
N  Σ • (t [·]) : σ1 → σ2 @v−−−→ N  Σ • (t v) : σ2
N  Σ  ni ; v−−−−−−→ N  Σ • (t v) : σ2
(Call-N)
N  Σ • E[(σ1→σ2SA (λx.t) v)] : σ (λx.t)−−−−→ N  Σ,E : σ2 → σ • v : σ1
N  Σ,E : σ2 → σ • v : σ1 v−→ N′  Σ,E : σ2 → σ
N  Σ • E[(σ1→σ2SA (λx.t) v)] : σ  (λx.t) ; v−−−−−−−−→ N′  Σ,E : σ2 → σ
(Call-L)
C || Se  C || Se′
N  Σ • t : σ τ
+
−−−→ N  Σ • t′ : σ
(Silent)
Figure 4: The Labelled Transition System over a λs-calculus configuration S.
λa-configuration can insert into a λs-configuration. The la-
belled reduction rules Call-L and Call-N describe the val-
ues the λa-configuration observes when either configuration
calls a function. The labelled reduction rules I-Wrong and
O-Done denote failure and termination. Reduction steps that
only modify the λs-configuration cannot be observed by a
λa-configuration and are thus labelled as silent, as denoted
in Silent.
Like for the bisimulation over the λs-calculus we define
a weak bisimulation over this LTS. Define the transition
relation t
γ+
=⇒ t′ as t τ
+
−−−→
∗
γ+−−−→ t′ where τ
+
−−−→
∗
is the
reflexive transitive closure of the silent transitions τ
+
−−−→.
Bisimulation is now defined as follows:
Definition 4. The relation S+ is a bisimulation if and only
if S1 S+ S2 implies:
(1) Given S1
γ+
=⇒ S′1 there is S′2 : S2 γ
+
=⇒ S′2 ∧S′1 S+ S′2
(2) Given S2
γ+
=⇒ S′2 there is S′1 : S1 γ
+
=⇒ S′1 ∧S′1 S+ S′2
We denote bisimilarity, the largest bisimulation, as ≈+.
5.2.3 Proof of Congruence
The proof that bisimilarity corresponds to contextual equiv-
alence is split into three sublemma: preservation, complete-
ness and soundness.
Lemma 1. (Preservation)
If S1 'c S2 and S1 γ
+
=⇒ S′1 and S2 γ
+
=⇒ S′2 then S′1 'c S′2
To simplify the proof of the completeness lemma, we show
that the LTS transitions preserve contextual equivalence.
Proof Sketch. We assume that:
S1 'c S2 ∧ S1 γ
+
=⇒ S′1 ∧ S2 γ
+
=⇒ S′2
We must show that:
S′1 'c S′2
The proof proceeds by case analysis on the label γ+. In this
proof sketch we consider two broad cases: the labels:
(λx.t), n, true, false, wrong, done,  (λx.t) ; v
describe the terms that the λa-context receives from ei-
ther configuration. Because identical labels cannot be dis-
tinguished by a λa-context the thesis holds. The labels:
@v,  n ; v
describe the modifications to the configuration S1 and S2.
We show that the thesis holds by reductio ad absurdum. For
the thesis not to hold there must be an input label that results
in a modification to the configurations S1 and S2 that cannot
be performed by a λa-context A. This is not the case for
either label.
Lemma 2. (Completeness) S1 'c S2 ⇒ S1 ≈+ S2
A proof sketch for this lemma that relies on Lemma 1 is
available in Appendix A.2.
As by Gordon [10] we show that contextual equivalence
is itself a bisimulation relation, by case analysis on the LTS
labels γ+.
Lemma 3. (Soundness) S1 ≈+ S2 ⇒ S1 'c S2
A full proof of this lemma is available in Appendix A.3. The
proof follows by induction on the number of reduction steps.
We show that given P1 = A || S1 and P2 = A || S2 that P2
diverges if P1 diverges.
We now conclude that bisimilarity ≈+ coincides with
contextual equivalence 'c.
Theorem 4 (Full Abstraction of the Bisimilarity).
S1 'c S2 ⇔ S1 ≈+ S2
Proof. The theorem follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
5.3 A Fully Abstract Compilation Scheme
Securely compiling a λs-calculus term t is done by produc-
ing the following λ+-configuration S:
t↓ = ?  ε • t : σ
where Γ ` t : σ.
We must now prove that this compilation scheme pre-
serves and reflects the equivalences of the λs-calculus. We
do so by showing that bisimilar terms in the λs-calculus co-
incide with bisimilar compiled terms in the λ+-calculus. The
proof is divided into three sublemma:
Lemma 4. (Compiler Correctness)
t1 →∗ v ⇐⇒ N  Σ • t∗ N  Σ • v
Proof Sketch. This follows from the fact that the semantics
of the λs-calculus are preserved in the λ+-calculus.
Lemma 5. (Comp. Preservation) t1 ≈s t2 ⇒ t1↓ ≈+ t2↓
A proof sketch is available in Appendix A.4. The proof
sketch proceeds by coinduction and case analysis on the
label γ+.
Lemma 6. (Comp. Reflection) t1↓ ≈+ t2↓ ⇒ t1 ≈s t2
A proof sketch is available in Appendix A.5. We prove the
lemma by the contrapositive: t1 6≈s t2 ⇒ t1↓ 6≈+ t2↓.
The proof proceeds by induction because if we have that
t1 6≈s t2 then there is a finite sequence of LTS transitions
until the bisimilarity≈s fails to hold. We show that any such
sequence can be reproduced in the λ+-calculus bisimulation.
We conclude that the compilation scheme is fully abstract.
Theorem 5 (Full Abstraction of the Compilation Scheme).
t1 ≈s t2 ⇐⇒ t1↓ ≈+ t2↓
Proof. The theorem follows from Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.
6. Related Work
Language Interoperation Techniques that ensure secure
interoperation between languages with different levels of ab-
straction, have been developed before. Furr and Foster ad-
dress the complications that arise when OCaml interoperates
with C, by developing a multi-language type system that em-
beds OCaml types in C and vice-versa [8]. They however do
not consider the fact that a C program can be an attacker ca-
pable circumventing their typing system by directly access-
ing the OCaml memory structures.
Tan et al. tackle the issues that arise when Java interoper-
ates with C through SafeJNI [23], a framework that ensures
type safety through the Java foreign function interface. Their
system however, requires both static and dynamic checks on
the C code that Java interoperates with. Our technique for
secure operational semantics, on the other hand, does not re-
quire any static checks on the attacker.
Gampe et. al present a technique that establishes the non-
interference properties of two interoperating languages with
different security typing mechanisms [9]. They do not con-
sider any attacker model.
Matthews’ and Findler’s multi-language semantics [15]
provide a technique for specifying operational semantics that
allows two languages to interoperate in a way that preserves
termination and type safety. In their work however, they
aim to abstract away low-level details and instead focus on
semantic properties. Our technique in contrast, focusses on
lifting low-level properties into the operational semantics.
Zdancewic et al. present a multi-agent calculus that treats
the different modules that make up a program as differ-
ent principals, each with a different view of the environ-
ment [26]. Their work however models the different views
each agents sees through typing.
Fully Abstract Compilation Secure (fully abstract) compi-
lation was first introduced by Abadi [1] as a criticism of the
way Java was translated into the Java bytecode language, and
of the way pi-calculus was translated into the spi-calculus.
Secure compilation has since been applied on many dif-
ferent source languages, such as the λ-calculus [2], the λ-
calculus extended with dynamic memory allocation [12] and
JavaScript [7].
This paper further developed on the secure compilation
schemes of Agten et. al [4] and Patrignani et al. [19], which
extend the target language of their secure compilers with a
memory protection mechanism.
Bisimulation Bisimulation has been applied to the λ-
calculus before, most notably by Abramsky in his work on
an applicative bisimulation for the lazy λ-calculus [3].
In this work we relied on Gordon’s proofs, LTS and
bisimulation statement for FPC [10]. Gordon’s approach
leverages Howe’s proof method for bisimulation [11], whose
syntactical approach greatly simplifies Abramsky’s domain
logic based technique.
Both Sumii and Pierce and Jeffrey and Rathke have
defined bisimulations for a λ-calculus with name genera-
tion [13, 22]. Our definition of bisimulation is however much
simpler than their respective definitions, as the names in our
multi-language system are both global and enumerable.
7. Conclusions & Future Work
This paper introduced operational semantics that preserve
the abstraction of a simply typed λ-calculus that interoper-
ates with the λ-calculus model of an arbitrary machine-level
attacker. These operational semantics lift the low-level mem-
ory protection techniques from the PMA mechanism into the
resulting multi-language system.
There are several directions for future work. One is to inves-
tigate a more fine-grained approach to secure interoperation.
One could imagine, for example, a multi-language system
where one must consider different types of attackers. In such
a scenario the goal should be to adapt the operational se-
mantics between two interoperating components to the level
of trust between both components. If a components attacker
model is not capable of intercepting function calls, for exam-
ple, the interoperation with that component should be more
symmetrical.
Another possibility is to research secure interoperation
semantics for concurrent languages. Given that our tech-
nique already removes the direct term embedding found in
most existing multi-language techniques it might be interest-
ing to remove the execution order dependencies as well.
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A. Proof Sketches and Proofs
A.1 The Bisimulation ≈s is a congruence
The definition of contextual equivalence is extended with a defini-
tion of contextual order ∼=s.
Definition 5. Contextual equivalence ('s) and Contextual Or-
der (∼=s) are defined as:
(1) t1 ∼=s t2 ⇐⇒
∀C. ∃b. C[t1]→∗ b ⇒ C[t2]→∗ b
(2) t1 's t2 ⇐⇒ t1 ∼=s t2 & t2 ∼=s t1
A non-symmetrical definition of bisimilarity, similarity is intro-
duced as well.
Definition 6. Simulation The relation Ss is defined as:
(1) Given t1
γ
=⇒ t1′ there is t2′ : t2 γ=⇒ t2′ ∧ t1′ Ss t2′
We denote similarity, as the largest simulation .s. Relying on the
symmetry property of both bisimilarity and contextual equivalence,
the proof is simplified to one that establishes that similarity equals
contextual order. The proof is split into two sublemma:
Lemma 7. (Completeness) t1 ∼=s t2 ⇒ t1 .s t2
Proof sketch. To prove that contextual order implies similarity it is
establish that contextual order is itself a similarity. Assume that :
C[t1] ∼=s C[t2] and t1 γ=⇒ t1′
We want to show that:
t2
γ
=⇒ t2′and t1′ ∼=s t2′
We restrict this proof sketch to the most interesting case: the label
@v.
From the contextual equivalence between t1 and t2 it follows
that t1 and t2 are both function types and thus both reduce to
λ-terms v1 and v2. Given that γ = @v it now follows from
the LTS that t′1 = (v1 v) and t′2 = (v2 v). The label @v can
thus be encoded as the context C = ([·] v), because contex-
tual order is closed under contexts we can now conclude that:
(v1 v) ∼=s (v2 v).
Proving the reverse, that similarity implies contextual order, is done
by applying Howe’s method [11]. Doing so requires the construc-
tion of a similarity candidate .b that includes its own compatible
refinement .̂• . The compatible refinement .̂• relates the fol-
lowing well-typed λs-terms: equal constants, variables and outer
forms that are related by .• . It relates λ-terms, for example, as
follows:
Γ,x : σ ` t1 .• t′1
Γ ` (λx : σ.t1) .̂• (λx : σ.t′1)
in a sense this compatible refinement relation constructs all possible
contexts a λs-term may be placed in.
The similarity candidate .b is defined as:
Γ ` t .̂• t′ Γ ` t′ .s t′′
Γ ` t .• t′′
Lemma 8. (Soundness) t1 .s t2 ⇒ t1 ∼=s t2
Proof sketch. We first prove that the similarity candidate .• is an
alternative definition of .s: .• = .b.
1. .s ⊆ .• . Given that.s is reflexive, it follows from structural
induction on t that: .• is reflexive and .̂• is reflexive.
Applying the fact that .̂• is reflexive to the definition of .̂•
allows us to conclude that: .s⊆ .• .
2. .• ⊆ .s. We show that .• is a simulation, by rule induction
on t
γ7−→ t′. The inductive case is: t1 τ−→ t′′1 γ−→ t′1. We must
show that t′′1 .• t2. This will allow us to conclude by the
induction hypothesis that t2
γ−→ t′2 and that t′1 .• t′2. To do
so we must examine each internal reduction step.
The λs-calculus has two internal reduction steps: function ap-
plication and if reduction. Both cases are covered in the Gordon
proof [10].
Now assume that:
C[t1]→∗ b and t1 .s t2 and C[t1] .s C[t2]
There are two cases:
• b = true. From the LTS it follows that:
C[t1]
true7−−−→ #t
From the definition of .s we conclude that:
C[t2]
true7−−−→ #t and thus that C[t2]→∗ #t.
• b = false, mutatis mutandis.
We now conclude that bisimilarity is a full abstraction of contextual
equivalence.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 3:
t1 's t2 ⇔ t1 ≈s t2
The theorem follows from Lemma 7 and 8 and the symmetrical
properties of bisimilarity and contextual equivalence.
A.2 Completeness
Proof Sketch. Proof sketch of Lemma 2:
S1 'c S2 ⇒ S1 ≈+ S2
Proving that contextual equivalence implies bisimilarity is done by
showing that the contextual equivalence relation is itself a bisimu-
lation.
Assume that: S1 'c S2.
Because bisimilarity is symmetrical, we divide the proof into two
parts:
1. Assume that: S1
γ+
=⇒ S′1.
We now want to show that there exists a S′2 such that:
(a) S2
γ+
=⇒ S′2
(b) S′1 'c S′2
The second thesis follows immediately from Lemma 1. We
prove the first thesis by case analysis on the label γ+. For every
label γ+ we establish the thesis by reductio ad absurdum: For
reductio assume that 6 ∃S′2.S2 γ
+
=⇒ S′2 then S1 6'c S2. Note that
we don’t consider the case: 6 ∃γ+.S2 γ
+
=⇒ S′2 as this implies that
the configuration S2 diverges or gets stuck which by Theorem 1
is not possible. Also note that we further simplify the proof by
only establishing that there exists a context that can distinguish
between S1 and S2, to comply with the definition of contextual
equivalence the context must also diverge in one case. In this
proof sketch we restrict ourselves to the most informative cases:
• γ+ = ni:: By the reduction rule S-Name we have that the
λa-context receives a name ni from the configuration S1. A
simple λa-context A = [·] can thus distinguish between S1
and S2 if S2 does not produce the same observable label ni.
• γ+ = (λx.t):: By the reduction rule S-Call we have that the
λa-context recieves a λ-term (λx.t) form the configuration
S1. A simple λa-context A = (λx.t) ≡ · can thus distin-
guish between S1 and S2 if S2 does not produce an observ-
able label (λx.t).
• γ+ = @ni:: By the reduction rule A-Name we have that the
λa-context can only apply the label @ni if the configuration
is passive and the name is of the correct type. A simple λa-
context A = ni can thus distinguish between S1 and S2 if
S2 cannot produce the observable label @ni.
• γ+ =  (λx.t) ; v:: By the reduction rules we have that
the λa-context will observe ((λx.t) v) from the first config-
uration S1. The context observes the application as a hole
as by the LTS and the reductions rules we have that when
the attacker resumes control it will either perceives the full
term or wrong if an incorrect value was applied. In the lat-
ter case a different label wrong is observed from S1. A
λa-context A = (((λx.t) v) ≡ [·] can thus distinguish be-
tween S1 and S2 if S2 does not produce an observable label
 (lamx.t) ; v.
• γ+ = ni ; v:: By the reduction rule A-Call we have that
the λa-context can apply the label  ni v if the configu-
ration is passive and the name is in the domain. By the
reduction rules WrongN, WrongC, WrongL and WrongB
we have that v must be of the correct type. Like the γ+ =
@ni case a λa-context A = (ni v) can thus distinguish be-
tween S1 and S2 if S2 cannot produce the observable label
 ni ; v.
• γ+ = wrong:: By the reduction rules WrongN, WrongC,
WrongL and WrongB we have that the S1 produces a label
wrong if the λa-context passes an incorrectly typed value
to S1. For any value v that is incorrectly typed for the
configuration S1 a λa-context A = v can thus distinguish
between S1 and S2 if S2 does not produce the observable
label wrong for the same context A.
2. As in case 1, mutatis mutandis.
A.3 Soundness Proof
Proof. Proof of Lemma 3.
S1 ≈+ S2 ⇒ S1 'c S2
As mentioned in Section 5.2.1 the thesis S1 'c S2 becomes
∀A. A || S1⇑ ⇐⇒ A || S2⇑ The proof is divided into two
cases, one case for each side of the co-implication.
1. ⇒ In this case the thesis is ∀A. A || S1⇑ ⇒ A || S2⇑ . The
thesis can be redefined as:
∀A. ∀k ∈ N. A || S1 k A′1 || S′1 ⇒
∀m ∈ N. A || S2 m A′2 || S′2
The proof proceeds by induction on m.
Base case: m = 0. Straightforward: A || S2 0 A || S2.
Inductive case: m = h+ 1. The thesis is:
A || S2 h+1 A′2 || S′2.
The inductive hypotheses (IH) is:
∀A. ∀k ∈ N. A || S1 k A′1 || S′1 ⇒
A || S2 h Ah2 || Sh2
We know from this IH that:
∃A.S1. A || S1 h Ah1 || Sh1 k−h A′1 || S′1
We prove the thesis by reasoning about what the presence
or absence of the last observable label γ+ tells us about
the existence of a next reduction step h + 1 . There are two
cases: either the λa-context A is passive or executing.
(a) The λa-context is passive:A =C and the λs-configuration
is executing: S = Se.
In this case there are two sub-cases:
i. ∃γ+. Seh1 γ
+
=⇒ Sh′1 .
By the assumption Se1 ≈+ Se2 we conclude that
Se
h
2
γ+
=⇒ Sh′2 and Sh
′
1 ≈+ Sh
′
2 . This, in conjunction
with the IH, implies the thesis:
A || S2 h+1 A′ || S′2.
ii. @γ+. Seh1
γ+
=⇒ Sh′1 .
An executing λs-configuration Se does not produce
an observable label if and only if it is diverging.
However because λs-configurations are stacks of
well typed λs-terms this is not possible.
(b) The λa-context is executing:A = t and the λs-configuration
is passive S = Sp.
In this case there are two sub-cases as well:
i. ∃γ+. Sph1 γ
+
=⇒ Sh′1 .
Because the observable label γ+ is produced by the
respective λa-configurations, we must thus show
that: Ah1 = Ah2 , where the existence of Ah2 derives
from the induction hypothesis.
We know by the assumption: S1 ≈+ S2 that both
λa-configurations were modified by the same stream
of observable labels if there are any such labels :
∃k ∈ N.k ≤ h ∧ A || S1 k Ak1 || Sk1 ∧
Ak1 || Sk1 h−k Ah1 || Sh1 where S1 γ
+
=⇒ Sk1 and
that ∃k ∈ N.k ≤ h ∧ A || S2 k Ak2 || Sk2 ∧
Ak2 || Sk2 h−k Ah2 || Sh2 where S2 γ
+
=⇒ Sk2 .
Combining the fact that the reduction rules of the
λ+-calculus are deterministic and with the fact that
the λa-contexts are updated in the same way by
identical labels γ+ we conclude that Ah1 = Ah2 and
that Sph2
γ+
=⇒ Sh′2 . This implies the thesis.
ii. 6 ∃γ+. Sph1 γ
+
=⇒ Sh′1 .
If there exists no label γ+ the λa-context is diverg-
ing. In the previous case we established that Ah1 =
Ah2 . As such both A || S1 and A || S2 divergence,
which implies the thesis.
2. ⇐ As in case 1, mutatis mutandis.
A.4 Compiler Preservation
Proof Sketch. Proof sketch of Lemma 5:
t1 ≈s t2 ⇒ t1↓ ≈+ t2↓
We must develop a relationR such that:
t1
↓ R t2↓ (1)
and that for all S1 R S2 we have that:
S1
γ+
=⇒ S1′ ∧ ∃S2′.S2 γ
+
=⇒ S2′ ⇒ S1′ R S2′ (2)
S2
γ+
=⇒ S2′ ∧ ∃S1′.S1 γ
+
=⇒ S1′ ⇒ S1′ R S2′ (3)
We build the following relationR = R0 ∪R1:
R0 ={(N1  Σ1,N2  Σ2) | ∀N1,N2,Σ1,Σ2 such that
N1 ≈N N2 and Σ1 ≈Σ Σ2}
R1 ={(N1  Σ1 • t1,N2  Σ2 • t2) | ∀N1,N2,Σ1,Σ2, t1, t2
such that (N1  Σ1,N2  Σ2) ∈ R0 and t1 ≈s t2}
where ≈N is defined as:
N1 ≈N N2 ⇐⇒ dom(N1) = dom(N2) and
∀ni ∈ dom(N1). N1(ni) ≈s N2(ni)
and where ≈Σ is defined as:
Σ1 ≈Σ Σ2 ⇐⇒
For (E11, ...,E
1
n) : (σ
1
1, ...,σ
1
n) in Σ1 and
(E21, ...,E
2
n′) : (σ
2
1, ...,σ
2
n) in Σ2
we have n = n′ and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n :σ1i = σ2i and
∀t′, t′′.Γ ` t′ : σ1i ∧ Γ ` t′′ : σ1i ∧ t′ ≈s t′′ ⇒ E1i [t′] ≈s E2i [t′′]
We now proof the three cases.
• In case (1) we have that ?  ε • t1 R ?  ε • t2 as we have
that t1 ≈s t2 from the assumption.
• In case (2) we proceed by case analysis on γ+. We restrict this
proof sketch to the most interesting labels.
γ+ = ni: By the LTS we have that:
S1 = N1  Σ1 • (λx.t1) : σ ni=⇒
N1[ni 7→ ((λx.t1),σ)]  Σ1 = S1′
and that:
S2 = N2  Σ2 • (λx.t2) : σ ni=⇒
N2[ni 7→ ((λx.t2),σ)]  Σ2 = S2′
Only the maps are modified in this case. By S1 R S2 we
have that (λx.t1) ≈s (λx.t2). We conclude that the thesis:
S′1 R S′2 holds.
γ+ = @ni: By the LTS we have that:
S1 = N1[ni 7→ (λx.t1)]  Σ1,E : σ1 → σ2 @ni==⇒
N1  Σ1 • E[(λx.t1)] : σ1 = S1′
and that:
S2 = N2[ni 7→ (λx.t2)]  Σ1,E : σ1 → σ2 @ni==⇒
N2  Σ2 • E[(λx.t2)] : σ1 = S2′
From the definition of ≈N it follows that (λx.t1) ≈s
(λx.t2). By the definition of ≈Σ we have that E[(λx.t2)]
≈s E[(λx.t1)]. We conclude that the thesis holds.
γ+ = (λx.t) v: By the LTS we have that:
S1 = N1  Σ1 • E1[(σfSA (λx.t) v1)] : σ  (λx.t); v======⇒
N′1  Σ1,E1 : σ2 → σ = S1′
and that:
S2 = N2  Σ2 • E2[(σfSA (λx.t) v2)] : σ  (λx.t); v======⇒
N′2  Σ2,E2 : σ2 → σ = S2′
By the LTS we know that N′1 6= N1 and N′2 6= N2 if and
only if the argument v is produced by the same label ni. By
the case γ+ = ni we conclude that N′1 ≈N N′2. We have
that E1 ≈s E2 as by S1 R S2 we know that they derive
from two ≈s bisimilar terms. We conclude that the thesis
holds.
• For case (3) we have that: mutatis mutandis.
A.5 Compiler Reflection
Proof Sketch. Proof sketch of Lemma 6:
t1
↓ ≈+ t2↓ ⇒ t1 ≈s t2
We prove the lemma by the contrapositive, the lemma is restated
as:
t1 6≈s t2 ⇒ t1↓ 6≈+ t2↓
The proof proceeds by induction because if we have that t1 6≈s t2
then there is a finite sequence of LTS transitions until the bisimilar-
ity ≈s fails to hold. There are two base cases:
1. t1
γ
=⇒ t1′∧ 6 ∃t2′. t2 γ=⇒ t2′: We proceed by case analysis over
the label γ:
• true: We have that: t1 →∗ #t true==⇒ t′1. By the assump-
tion, t1 6≈s t2 and the LTS we have that: t2 →∗ v2 where
v2 6= #t. By Lemma 4 we have that t1↓ ∗ #t↓ and
t2
↓ ∗ v2↓. We conclude from the λ+-calculus LTS that
the thesis holds.
• false: analogous to true.
• @v: In this case t1 →∗ (λx.t11) @v=⇒ t′1 and t2 →∗ v2
where v2 6= (λx.t22).
By Lemma 4 we have that t1↓ →∗ (λx.t11)↓ and t2↓ ∗
v2
↓. We conclude from the λ+-calculus LTS that the thesis
holds.
2. t2
γ
=⇒ t2′ ∧ 6 ∃t1′. t1 γ=⇒ t1′: Similar to case 1.
By the LTS of the λs-calculus we have that if:
t1
γ
=⇒ t1′ ∧ t2 γ=⇒ t2′ ∧ t1′ 6≈s t2′
then γ = @v, because if γ = true or false then t1′ ≈s t2′. We
thus have one inductive case. Given:
t1
@v,@v
====⇒ tn+11 ∧ t2 @v,@v====⇒ tn+12 ∧ tn+11 6≈s tn+12
We must show that
t1
↓ γ+,γ+====⇒ Sn+11 ∧ t2↓ γ
+,γ+
====⇒ Sn+12 ∧ Sn+11 6≈+ Sn+12
By the inductive hypothesis:
t1
@v
=⇒ tn1 ∧ t2 @v=⇒ tn2 ∧ tn1 6≈s tn2 ⇒
t1
↓ γ+=⇒ Sn1 ∧ t2↓ γ
+
=⇒ Sn2 ∧ Sn1 6≈+ Sn2
By the λs-calculus LTS rule Label-App, the λ+-calculus LTS rules
O-Name and Call-N and the observation that for any value v there
is an equivalent value v we have that for any for any (λx.t):
(λx.t)
@v
=⇒ ((λx.t) v) ⇐⇒
N  (λx.t) ni=⇒ ni ; v====⇒ N, [ni 7→ (λx.t)]  ((λx.t) v)
This in conjunction with the IH implies the thesis.
